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ABSTRACT
This study is an analysis of an advisory committee disposition
process consisting of four meetings that took place between
August and December of 1987. The committee was created by the
Division of Capital Planning and Operations (DCPO) for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the real property and planning
office for the state. Its purpose was to determine how to
redistribute a surplus parcel of state property.
The parcel of land described in this case is that of the
Massachusetts College of Art (MCA), a state art college. Since
the state polled local and other state agencies and determined
the MCA site to be surplus in 1984, it will be available for
development by public or private- agencies or both within the next
five years. DCPO assembled an advisory committee, to begin
developing reuse restriction guidelines for the property. The old
MCA parcel is located in the Longwood Medical Area, one of the
most concentrated medical areas in the country. Consequently,
there is interest on the part of the hospitals to develop the
property which exacerbates an historical tension between the
medical institutions and surrounding neighborhoods.
This thesis has been undertaken in order to document and analyze
the state's policy toward the disposition of public property,
which it is argued, represents a modus operandi that is pervasive
throughout United States bureaucracies and dominates government
policy. It is a position that reflects the traditional
ambivalence between democracy and capitalism, decentralization
and centralized executive power. This study demonstrates how
contemporary bureaucracies reflect the existing tensions within
the system, and how they form policy as a result of them. The
author includes policy recommendations for future DCPO large
disposition projects.
This study analyzes the perspective of DCPO Office of Real
Property during the meetings that constitute the fact finding
component of the advisory meeting process. It examines DCPO's
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intervention as a planning agency for the public while evaluating
community and institutional roles. The author has analyzed four
advisory committee meetings, and has supplemented this analysis
with information from interviews of various participants,
reports, briefing documents, and information sheets. Finally,
these facts are put into a framework and conclusions are
presented.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Edwin Melendez
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban Studies
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OVERVIEW
In this study we will examine the Massachusetts Division of
Papital Planning and Operations (DCPO) disposition process for
large parcels of land and in so doing will evaluate the state's
public policy objectives and the role of its bureaucracies.
DCPO's actions reveal how it views it responsibilities as the
Commonwealth's real property office. It is the state bureaucracy
that manages, leases, and disposes of all public property in the
state of Massachusetts.
We will also examine the disposition process in order to
determine whether or not there is a clear policy about the type
or amount of benefits to which the community is entitled and how
the process of community participation is defined. An
examination of the state's planning role will reveal how well it
mediates between community interests and private/nonprofit
institutional interests. The parcel in the disposition case is
the Massachusetts College of Art (MCA) parcel, a 70,000 sq. ft.
building on a 2.2 acre site located in the Longwood Medical Area-
-a concentrated and presitigious medical area. The MCA is the
only existing state art college in the country.
In the early 1980's, the MCA moved most of its departments from
its building on the corner of Longwood and Brookline Avenues to
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its new campus on Huntington Avenue, leaving some hard to
relocate kilns and laboratories behind. When the state polled
local and state agencies and determined the old MCA site to be
surplus, it made the site available for development by private
4gencies when the college relocates its final departments within
the next five years. For over thirty years the medical
institutions of the LMA, in particular, Beth Israel Hospital
(BI), one of the five leading medical institutions in the
Longwood Medical Area, has let it be known that it is interested
in purchasing the MCA property for its own expansion.
BI's interest exacerbates an historical tension between the
medical institutions and the local community. Since the 1950s,
when the hospitals started to expand and develop their physical
sites, they encroached upon the surrounding neighborhoods,
eliminating housing stock , and causing problems such as traffic
congestion, parking scarcity, and noise and air pollution. Due
to the fact that the MCA site is the last public parcel left in
the LMA, the community has been determined to derive substantial
benefits from it. This study examines the DCPO disposition
process in order to understand the state policy toward protecting
public land and its trend toward privatizing property.
The following questions will be addressed in this study. Will
the DCPO disposition process favor BI given certain tendencies in
land markets--which neither DCPO or BI can escape or prevent?
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Will DCPO accept BI's proposal for development because it allows
itself to be influenced by private institutions and has rigged
its meeting process to achieve these ends? Will DCPO choose the
best possible developer to purchase and plan the MCA site--which
pay be BI--through a democratic disposition process?
This study analyzes four meetings of an advisory committee
process--which represent the fact finding component of the
process--that took place between August and December of 1987.
The meetings were assembled by DCPO for the purpose of developing
reuse restriction guidelines for the MCA surplus parcel.
In their presentations and comments, the various committee
members from the three different sectors will reveal underlying
assumptions about the mediating role of bureaucracies, private
institutions--especially large and economically powerful
nonprofit organizations--and the role of community participation.
All of these perceptions affect the outcome of the disposition
process.
We will explore DCPO's approach toward the dispostion process, as
well as notions of administrative efficieny, citizen
participation, and the operation of land markets. In all of our
reflections, it will be important to keep in mind that the DCPO
large disposition process is still fairly new. Legislation which
was created in reaction to corrupt practices in the Commonwealth,
has gaps that are now beginning to reveal themselves as DCPO
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continues to evolve as a bureaucracy. This thesis describes the
challenges associated with the development of a public land
disposition policy. It discusses past contradictions between
democracy and capitalism, centralized and decentralized
government--issues that continue to influence state government
today.
Finally, this thesis presents a context for comprehending future
state policy directives regarding effective community
participation and the distribution of development benefits.
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework
The Bureaucratic Dilemma
As a large state bureaucracy, The Massachusetts Division of
Capital Planning and Operations (DCPO) acts within a broader
framework that is shared by other bureaucracies. Its vision, like
so many other contemporary agencies reflects the tension between
contradictory political philosophies in the United States. This
is only logical since bureaucracies are governmental
organizations designed to create and administrate state policies.
In the United States, the government has been historically
trapped between the prevailing ideologies of democracy and
capitalism. It follows therefore that U.S. bureaucracies are
similarly caught between two opposite poles: protecting the
common good and representing the interests of the most powerful
groups in society.
Bureaucracies reflect the dilemma of a larger political system
that embraces two ideologies in opposition. In their book,
Democracy and Capitalism, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis
describe how the coexistence of these opposing ideologies within
the American system of government results in an "indeterminancy
concerning the range of application of particular rights" which
allows conflicting interest groups to exploit the inherent
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contradictions to achieve their own political ends. Bowles and
Gintis describe the clash of pluralism and capitalism:
The first is the expansionary logic of personal rights,
progressively bringing ever wider spheres of society
--the management of the economy and the internal
relationships of the family, for example--under at
least the formal if not the substantive rubric of
liberal democracy. The second tendency concerns the
expansionary logic of capitalist production, according
to which the capitalist firm's ongoing search for
profits progressively encroaches upon all spheres of
social activity, leaving few realms of life untouched
by the imperatives of accumulation and the market. If
we are correct, the present and future trajectories of
liberal democratic capitalism will be etched in large
measure by the collision of these two expansionary
tendencies.1
Historically bureaucracy has mirrored political development.
Bureaucracy evolved in nineteenth century America as a result of
U.S. industrialization. Political philosophers of the period
were impressed by new rational modes of operation in businesses
and factories which originated from scientific developments.
Emerging technologies led to the mass production of goods and
played a major role in changing the U.S. economy and labor force.
Political philosophers of this era, looking for ways to improve
government, turned to science and industry to provide a framework
for the proper kind of American political system.
1Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism
(New York: Basic Books, 1986) p. 29.
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By the end of the nineteenth century the doctrine of
administrative efficiency had gained strong following among many
political thinkers of the period. Government, these philosophers
believed, should operate as rationally and competently as a well
oiled machine. In 1887, Woodrow Wilson, wrote in an influential
essay entitled, "The Study of Administration," that
administration involves the discovery "of what government can
properly and successfully do, and secondly, how it can do these
proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at the best
possible cost either of money or energy." Wilson relied upon
business analogies in his analysis. He believed that efficient
administration like the successful firm required similar
institutional qualities: centralized authority, objective
rationality, and professionalism.2
Administrative efficiency was viewed as the key to personal and
public prosperity. By the nineteenth century, successful firms
and factories in the U.S. were producing huge financial rewards
for their owners and elevating them to a privileged class.
Entrepreneurs who owned profitable businesses gained access to
power through purchasing real estate, employing residents from
the local population, and often participating in local
government. They became a class of capitalists who believed that
2Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration ,Political
Science Quarterly 2, no. 2, (June, 1887) p. 197.
9
they should pass on the lessons learned from business to society.
Prosperous businesses led to a strong American economy.
It was in the interest of entrepreneurs to maintain capitalism as
a system. As the most privileged class under capitalism, they
had the most to gain from the continuation of the system.
Maurice Dobb, in his book, Studies in the Development of
Capitalism, argues that the class that is socially and
politically dominant at the time will use any power that it has
to preserve the existing relationship between classes on which
its income depends. Dobb characterizes capitalism as a
"distinctive economic order" in which "either one class or a
coalition of classes with some common interest, constitutes the
dominant class, and stands in partial or or complete antagonism
to another class or classes." 3
One traditional way that capitalists have maintained a dominant
position in society has been by influencing government policy.
William Domhoff in his article, "State and Ruling Class in
Corporate America," theorizes about the processes through which
economically and politically active members of the the privileged
3Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism,
Chapter 1, (International Publishers, 1963) in Richard E.
Edwards, Michael Reich, and Thomas Weisskopf, The Capitalist
System, "The Essence of Capitalism" (New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
1978) p. 51.
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class involve themselves in government at all levels. Some of
these processes include:
... the development and implementation of general
policies that are important to the interests of the
ruling class as a whole...[and] the formation,
dissemination, and enforcment of attitudes and
assumptions which permit the continued existence
of policies and politicians favorable to the wealth,
income, status, and privileges of members of the
ruling class.4
Governmental influence may be indirect, resulting in tax breaks,
subsidies, or procedural rulings. For it is in the interest of
government to appear "neutral" in the class struggle. It is
supposed to be open to all interests and politics.5
It is paradoxical that Americans have simultaneously responded to
notions of democratic pluralism as adamantly as they have
enbraced the free market system. When the United States was
founded in the eighteenth century, Thomas Jefferson, James
Madison, Alexis de Tocqueville, and many others advocated for a
government that responded to many different and often conflicting
constituencies--a decentralized government where there would be a
pitting of "faction against faction to ensure liberty." 6 The
4William Domhoff, "State and Ruling Class in Corporate
America," Insurgent Sociologist (Spring, 1974), vol.4, no.3
5Richard E. Edwards, Michael Reich, and Thomas Weisskopf,
The Capitalist System (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1978) p. 254.
6Douglas Yates, Bureaucratic Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1982) p. 4.
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creation of bureaucracy--multiple offices and agencies to
administrate governmental tasks--was initially intended as a
means toward avoiding the concentration of power.
Democratic pluralism was viewed as a system that would safeguard
the interests of those without money or property. It is a
philosophy that continues to be advocated by contemporary
political thinkers and social scientists. Robert Dahl has
written that pluralism is a system in which "there is a high
probability that an active and legitimate group in the population
can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the
process of decision." Dahl in his book A Preface to Democratic
Theory, expands upon this when he writes that, in an effective
pluralist system of government, "one or more offices are not
only ready to listen to the noise but expect to suffer in some
significant way if they do not placate the group, its leaders, or
its most vociferous members." 7 David Truman argues in his book,
Governmental Process, that although the pluralist system may be
awkward, it is a process in which interest groups seeking to
influence policy are guaranteed a number of points of access. 8
Thus, citizen's participation is essential to a pluralistic view
of government.
7Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1956) p. 145
8David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1955) p. 502
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But the democratic pluralist vision has always presented problems
to government. As individuals and groups struggle to protect
their own interests, some of them will emerge dissatified. There
is often a competition among groups for limited resources. If
officials are committed to the representation of opposing groups
then they must spend a great deal of their time mediating
conflicts, or at least processing them. Decision making in
general is more complicated and time consuming. Compromises
intended to incorporate various conflicting groups and interests
to arrive at a common policy will alienate portions of the
population. Democratic pluralism which was intended by the
architects of the U.S. government as an egalitarian form of
government produces conflicts which creates a dilemma in its
administration.
It was for these reasons that political reformers continued the
eighteenth century debate over whether a democratic pluralist
government should have a centralized or decentralized government.
In 1887, Woodrow Wilson wrote "If [power] be divided, dealt out
in shares to many, it is obscured; and if it is obscured, it is
made irresponsible."9 Others supporting this argument stressed
the ineffectiveness of a government attempting to incorporate
many different interests. To their way of thinking, such a
government would be unable to function. For these reasons,
Wilson argued for strong government officials, selected on the
9Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," pp.209-210
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basis of competence and merit, and protected from the
complexities of politics.
Others advocated centralization because they felt it buttressed
democractic pluralism. In bureaucracies, they viewed
professionalism, as key to solving the inherent the conflict
between interest groups. Trained and skilled, administrators
would make judgements between groups based on what was most
appropriate in a given situation. Although these proposals
would leave some groups dissatisfied, the solutions would be
acceptable because they were politically neutral. If decisions
were occasionally incorrect, citizens would have to be protected
against bureaucratic misjudgements since bureaucrats would be
faithful to the administrative process values of accessibility,
accountability, and responsibility.
The view that bureaucracies will provide checks and balances
while somewhat plausible, is for the most part misleading.
Opponents of the notion of centralized government argued that the
decisions that bureaucrats make, whether substantive or
administrative, are partisan decisions. An administrator's
decision depends on his or her particular point of view or
political orientation. Although many rules and regulations
governing bureaucracies are legislatively defined, administrators
acting on behalf of bureaucracies have varying amounts of leeway
to support the interest groups of their choice.
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In his article, "Functions of a Bureaucratic Ideology: 'Citizen
Participation'," Elliott Krause claims that "bureaucracies are
users of ideologies, aimed at target groups for the purpose of
energizing these groups toward the interest of the bureaucracy
and groups who are in a position to use it for their own ends." 1 0
Douglas Yates, in his book, Bureaucratic Democracy, supports the
argument for a decentralized government when he questions the
bureaucrat's claim that he or she responds to all political
factions equally. He writes:
The problem is that there is considerable variation in
ordinary use of terms like accessibility, responsiveness,
accountability, and participation. Does responsiveness
mean being available to hear the complaints of a citizen
or congressman, or does it mean recognizing those complaints
and satisfying them? "'ll
William Boyer argues in Bureaucracy on Trial, that "the laws
which created bureaucracies and their goals can be widely and
variously interpreted by the bureaucracies themselves, once they
are in existence."12
In this thesis, the author argues for professional administrators
who understand the intricacies, contradictions, and dangers of
1 0 Elliott A. Krause, "Functions of a Bureaucratic Ideology:
'Citizen Participation"' Social Problems, 16(2) (Fall, 1968)
p.129-143.
llYates, Bureaucratic Democracy, p. 172
1 2 William B. Boyer, Bureaucracy on Trial (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1964)
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the system. What is vital to adherents of either centralized or
decentralized pluralistic democracy is that administrators
recognize the power that they wield and act in roles that
demonstrate their responsibility. Donald Schon, in his article
"Some of What a Planner Knows," writes that bureaucrats or--as
he calls them--planners, must assume different kinds of roles.
Schon's new repertoire of functions for the bureaucrat/planner
include the following:
...understanding the field of actors and interests
with its potentials for satisfaction, frustration,
mutual constraint, or mutual enhancement; formulating
issue-specific targets for negotiation, mediation,
or inquiry; creating conditions for effective control
or evasion of control, for successful negotiation, or
productive inquiry; designing intermediary interventions
and assessing their effectiveness; maintaining the
conditions of credibility and legitimacy on which the
intermediary roles depend.1 3
The administrator, from Schon's point of view is more of a
strategist or facilitator, an image quite different than
Woodrow Wilson's autocratic executive.
Most contemporary bureaucracies have not yet defined their
positions on these issues. Administrators who have been schooled
in the doctrine of efficiency and professionalism make decisions
based on values such as "highest and best use," which they deem
13Donald A. Schon, "Some of What a Planner Knows," Journal
of the American Planning Association, (Summer, 1982) p. 354
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as objective standards free from political influence. They
include citizens on their policy making committees, thinking
that this constitutes adequate representation. But participation
is not a guarantee of democracy. Citizens must be given real
decision making power if bureaucrats wish to insure fair
outcomes. Bureaucracies must be clear about their goals. The
inclusion of citizens will not insure the advancement of social
justice, economic equality, or even majority rule. In Politics
and Markets, C.E. Lindblom writes that the involvement of
various interest groups in a process does not insure that all of
them will be equal in their political resources. It will be the
most powerful special interest that will dominate, Lindblom
claims, suppressing the interest of others. 14
In a free market system where capitalist institutions occupy
privileged positions, nonbusiness groups must compete financially
in order to wield a similar kind of influence and most of the
time they cannot. To confuse matters more, bureaucratic interests
in recent years have expanded to include power factions such as
constituencies within the community that may potentially attract
state or federal grants, large nonprofit revenue producers, and
even community projects that might justify the bureaucracy's
existence so that it will continue to be funded.
Bureaucracies are influential in forming public opinion and
1 4Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic
Books, 1977).
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promoting their own interests. Since there is a tendency in the
U.S. for bureaucracies to be large, the decisions that they make
carry more weight. In a state bureaucracy, heterogeneous
officials and offices are turned into a coherent organization
with shared orientations and assumptions--this stablizes certain
policy inclintions among the state managers. Evans, Rueschemeyer,
and Skopol in Bringing the State Back In argue that:
The intricate meshing of expertise with a given
personnel and organizational form gives these
inclinations a powerful influence.. .Although by
design bureaucracies may only implement policies,
in actuality they shape them, too. It is the very
same processess that constitute the institutional
foundations and the operational capacity of
bureaucratic organization that also set limits to
the range of policy options for which the state
apparatus is a willing and effective instrument." 15
There have been some periods in history, when the state has
favored the disempowered in its policies. In the era following
World War II, with the development of the welfare state,
government policy reinforced the protection of rights, for such
groups as the poor and ethnic minorities, and profit-making
business activities were monitored. Capitalist corporations were
given notice that while they would be permitted considerable
expansion, they "would be subject to social scrutiny." This era,
15Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skopol,
Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge University Press, 1986)
p. 52.
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according to Bowles and Gintis, empowered citizens to challenge
the basic operations of the capitalist economy and in so doing
"sapped its dynamism."16
However Bowles and Gintis write that although this postwar policy
gave community interest groups the power to compete with
entrepreneurs, capitalism still maintained its stronghold. They
argue:
...the welfare state and Keynesian economic policies
had been carefully circumscribed; they did not give
citizens the power to assume these critical economic
functions, nor did they provide the public arena within
which citizens could develop their capacities to render
economic decision making democratically accountable.
Equally important, the postwar system.. .gave capital a
decisive upper hand in dictating the pattern of
organizational innovation and structural change. The
result has been an econonomic and political standoff
in which business elites and the citizenry alike have
veto power over economic change but share no viable
common vision of the economic future. 17
Is it possible to create bureaucracies that are run efficiently
and that represent both powerful and powerless interest groups in
the name of democratic pluralism? Given the contradictory
political system, we have shown that there will be a tendency on
the part of bureaucracies to reflect the capitalist system which
favors the financially privileged class. This means that certain
16Bowles and Gintis, p. 5.
17 Bowles and Gintis, p. 6.
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interest groups such as the poor and the elderly will continue to
remain at a disadvantage. If there are no additional incentives,
there will be a tendency on the part of executives to support,
revenue producing ventures and to only include the community in a
superficial way.
If bureaucracies such as the Massachusetts Division of Capital
Planning and Operations are truly committed to a democratic
pluralist form of government, they must deal responsibly with the
issue of unequal income distribution among its citizens and the
draw of capitalism. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skopol write that
income distribution is the most challenging test for effective
bureaucracies. When agencies attempt to directly redistribute
resources they "almost by definition become involved in relations
between dominant and subordinate groups." The concept of
redistributing income, they say, works "against the grain of both
the market and social norms." Agencies cannot rely on
information generated by market mechanisms, neither can they
legitimate their activities by market criteria. The policies of
these agencies often stand in conflict with the policies of other
government bureaucracies.18
This author argues that bureaucratic decisions must be made by
administrators playing more intermediary roles, regulated by
stringent legislation. Laws must be enacted to safeguard the
18Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, p. 53.
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disempowered class in order to balance market tendencies. If
bureaucracies wish to claim that they are including the community
in their policies, they must be absolutely sure that their laws
prescribing such areas as executive power and the power of
citizen's advisory committees, reflect this concern. Legislation
insuring community rights will empower citizen participants in
future DCPO disposition projects. It is a slow but effective
process.
The Massachusetts College of Art land disposition case is an
example of a bureaucracy that has started to institute such a
democratic process. Through the creation of legislation which
called for an advisory committee with citizen participants to
determine reuse restriction guidelines, the door was opened for
open interaction and negotiation between the neighborhoods and
institutions of the Longwood Medical Area. Although the author
predicts that one powerful medical institution will ultimately be
awarded the development rights for the MCA property, the
community will emerge with greater benefits which will serve as a
precedent for future neighborhood groups.
Once DCPO and other bureaucracies institute such legal mechanisms
such as guaranteed equal community representation and veto power
in their policy making processes, they will begin to erode their
inherent bias toward private sector interests. Over time they
21
will become more representative of diverse interest groups. In
so doing, this author believes that the balance in power will
slowly shift to a system that is more egalitarian in its vision.
22
Chapter 2: Background Information to the MCA Disposition Case
This chapter provides historical facts and other background
information which put the Massachustts College of Art case into a
context for consideration.
History of the MCA
The Massachusetts College of Arts (MCA), was the first and is the
only remaining state supported autonomous art college in the
country. It was established in 1873 as a reaction to nineteenth
century industrial trade fairs in Europe. American merchants of
the era, who viewed manufactured goods from around the world,
feared losing business due to more sophisticated Europeon
products, and therefore created legislation to advance the cause
of industrial design in the U.S.
In Massachusetts this concern resulted in the creation of The
Industrial Drawing Act of 1870, a law enacted to teach design
techniques that would make Massachusetts commercial goods more
appealing. It required every city in the commonwealth with a
population of 10,000 or more to provide free drawing lessons to
residents over age fifteen. The Massachusetts College of Art,
first known as the Massachusetts Normal Art School, was started
in order to train qualified educators who could teach courses in
23
the public schools that would eventually produce skilled
draughtsmen.
At first the School focused exclusively on industrial drawing and
geometry. Then in 1880 due to a growing national interest in arts
gad crafts, the curriculum was expanded to include manual
training. By 1887, when the School moved from two rented rooms at
Pemberton Square to the first building specifically designed for
it at Exeter and Newbury streets, enrollment was projected at 350
students. The Commonwealth empowered the School to confer the
Bachelors of Science in Education in 1922, reflecting a move
toward commercial training. In 1929 the building on the corner
of Brookline and Longwood Avenues was constructed, and in 1930 it
was dedicated. The School was permitted to award the Bachelors of
Fine Arts in 1950, and in 1960 the Massachusetts College of Art
became the school's official name."'
During the 1950's and 60's, in response to a growing demand, the
MCA's curriculum expanded to include a broad range of courses at
the graduate and undergraduate levels. Today, there are about
1200 undergraduates studying for a Bachelor of Fine Arts in four
major areas: art education, art history, design, and fine arts.
"'Boston Landmarks Commission and Boston Redevelopment
Authority, Fenway Project Completion Report (Part I). 1983 Survey
and Planning Grant (August, 1984).
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In addition, the college now offers a Master of Fine Arts and a
Master of Science in Art Education. About 100 students are
working toward these graduate degrees. Other students at the
school are pursuing the Certificate in Graphic Design or the
Pertification License in Art Education.2 0
In the 1980's, in an effort to expand and modernize the school's
operations, the MCA, Board of Regents and DCPO began planning for
the relocation of the school onto a new larger site on Huntington
Avenue. Originally constructed for Boston State College, this
campus was to be vacated by its most recent tenant, Roxbury
Community College. MCA has now begun to occupy buildings on this
new campus. Complete consolidation of MCA on the Huntington
Avenue campus will occur once renovation of the buildings for
their new uses has been completed.
Architecture of MCA Building
The main fascade of the MCA building is composed of buff-colored
brick trimmed with cast-stone details. The central pavillion is
ornamented by stained glass windows crafted by William Burnham,
gargoyles, and medallions depicting the different artistic
disciplines. Two arched doorways on either side of the main
2
oKay Ransdell, editor, Massachusetts College of Art
Catalogue (1987).
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entrance bear inscriptions from Ralph Waldo Emerson and Horace
Mann. Other features include brick parapets, skylights, and
copper clad roofs.
The interior of the building consisting of a 300-seat auditorium,
classrooms, offices, and a library, is largely unornamented. The
classroom interiors are of utilitarian design with a mixture of
concrete, wood and linoleum floor coverings, undecorated plaster
walls, and acoustical tile and plaster ceilings.
The firm of Henry & Richmond--a firm that was the successor to
the prominent Boston architectural firm of Guy Lowell--designed
the building. The property was purchased by the commonwealth in
1927 and construction began in 1929. From the start, the
relatively small size of the site eliminated the possibility of
building a dormitory, and budget constraints necessitated the
construction of a single classroom and studio rather than a
campus of several buildings. The new building which cost
$600,000 was dedicated in 1930.
In designing the building, the architects consulted with faculty
and students of the MCA. Subsequently they chose to combine
several architectural styles, most prominently Tudor Gothic and
Art Deco design. The building's structure of stepped massing with
a central block was influenced by the Moderne Style. Specific
ornamental details such as the stained glass windows at the
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fourth storey and wrought-iron lanterns at the principal entries
represent the outlook of the Arts and Crafts Movement of the
early twentieth century, in which artists sought to apply their
skills to the design of architectural and industrial objects.2 1
Historical Preservation Status
In its 1983 survey of the Fenway, the MCA building has been
identified by the Boston Landmarks Commission (BLC) as being
eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places.
The BLC is in the process of preparing the nomination. The
Massachusetts Historical Commission, which performs as the local
adminstrative arm for the National Register, concurred with BLC's
preliminary evaluation, and will- hold a public hearing at some
future time to determine whether the MCA application will be
submitted to the National Register for final review.
At the third MCA disposition advisory committee meeting, Judy
McDonough, Executive Director of Boston Landmarks, explained in a
presentation that a National Register listing alone does not
insure preservation. She added that what a listing does is
"ensure that the property will receive the preservation approach
to community planning," through the accompanying environmental
2
'Boston Landmarks Commission and Boston Redevelopment
Authority Report (August 1984).
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reviews. In response to a question about tax incentives for
maintaining an historically significant building, McDonough
responded that tax incentives have become increasingly more
difficult to utilize and less frequently awarded.2 2 In terms of
preservation, court orders and fines to prevent demolition are
issued only when a piece of property has been listed with the
local historical commission, which in this case is the BLC. So
far the MCA has been ineligible for BLC listing.
Disposition History of the Parcel
Recognizing that the Longwood parcel would not be required
for MCA use once the new campus was complete, on December 13,
1983, the Board of Regents declared the parcel surplus to its
needs conditional on the relocation of the college. On February
2, 1984, DCPO informed the Regents that it intended to interpret
the Board's vote as a present declaration that the property is
surplus--thereby enabling DCPO to initiate disposition planning
for this property--with the express understanding that the
College's activities must be satisfactorily relocated before
final disposition can occur.
Over the past two and one half years, both state and local
2 2 Massachusetts Division of Capital Planning and Operations,
Minutes for Meeting 3 (October 15, 1987) pp. 3 & 4.
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agencies have been polled to determine whether there was public
sector interest in developing this property for direct public
use. The deadlines have now passed with no expressions of
interest from either a state or local entity.
A request for legislative authorization to dispose of the
property was included in the Board of Regents legislation filed
in March of 1987. Thus, pending legislative authorization, the
development of reuse guidelines and the relocation of the
Massachusetts College of Art, the property is available for
development by a private entity.
Zoning of the MCA Parcel
The Massachusetts College of Arts building is located in an H-3
zone which allows for a variety of uses and public uses. A large
number of conditional uses for such facilities as libraries,
museums, medical facilities, laboratories, dormitories, and day
care centers are permitted. Uses not currently allowed under
this zoning include retail shops and restaurants. The permitted
floor area ratio (FAR) for the ,parcel is 3.0. There is no height
limit. At a FAR of 3.0, this allows a total development of
296,448 square feet.2 3
2 Henderson Planning Group, Design and Development
Guidelines, Massachusetts College of Art Site, prepared for
Medical Area Service Corporation (January, 1985) p. 16.
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History of the LMA
Over the past one hundred years the Longwood Medical Area (LMA)
developed from an area of farms and marshland to the most highly
concentrated center for medical and educational institutions in
poston today. Urban development began in the area just before
1890. The LMA was once part of the towns of Roxbury and
Brookline. Some of the wealthiest families in the city resided in
this area on huge estates whose boundaries determined the
original street patterns in the LMA. Changes in the Muddy
River's alignment by Frederick Law Olmsted in 1844 and 1890
established the boundary with Brookline.
Boston's westward expansion and consequent settlement of what is
now the LMA was greatly influended by the Back Bay Landfill
project dating from 1858 to 1882. Substantial growth occurred
soon thereafter due to street construction and the development of
the electric train. Boston's population was rapidly growing and
as it became congested it started to expand westward into vacant
Riverway land. Due to the new accessibility this section now
became an extension of the urban center. Between 1900 and 1910
over 900 units of row house and two family middle income housing
were constructed by developers, predominantly in the area south
of Francis Street.
Harvard Medical School first moved to its present site in 1905;
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its medical quadrangle was erected in 1906. In order to ensure an
affiliation with hospitals for its clinical teaching, Harvard
purchased 26 acres of land, 11 acres for itself and 15 acres for
other institutions. This land was subsequently sold to Peter Bent
Prigham Hospital and Children's Hospital.
During the first part of the twentieth century, there was a
blossoming of institutions in the LMA, which included the
Isabella Gardner Museum (1903), New England Deaconess Hospital
(1903), Simmons Female College (1904), Harvard Medical School
(1906), Girl's Latin and Normal Schools (1906-1907), Harvard
Dental School (1908-1909), Winsor School (1910), Emmanuel College
(1914), Peter Bent Brigham Hospital (1913), Children's Hospital
(1914), English High School (1915), and Massachusetts College of
Pharmacy (1918). The flourishingj continued in the twenties and
thirties, with the emergence of Boston Public Latin High School
(1922), Beth Israel Hospital (1928), the School of the Museum
pf Fine Arts (1929-1930), and the Massachusetts College of Art
(1930).
By 1948, most Longwood and Brookline Avenue frontage had been
developed. Longwood had become a "main street" for those
institutions along it. In contrast, Brookline Avenue had a less
dense and ordered development. From 1948-1968 the institutions
entered a new growth phase. Most institutions began to fill in
their sites, replacing older, smaller buildings and spreading
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with growth to an identifiable boundary such as a street, park,
or adjacent major user.
Specialized patient treatment facilities were built in the
1950's: Judge Baker, Joslin Clinic, the Jimmy Fund. By the mid-
50's, most of the hospitals had expanded facilities on their
existing sites. In the late 60's, the Dana Farber Center was
created. Educational facilities such as the new English High
School, Harvard Medical School, and Boston State College
constructed highrises of ten stories or more.2 4
LMA Street Patterns
The Longwood Medical Area is located west of downtown Boston,
enclosed within the triangle of Huntington Avenue, the Riverway,
and the Fenway. The two major streets in the area are Longwood
Avenue, running from southeast to northwest, and Brookline
Avenue, running from southwest to northeast.
Other streets within the subarea are generally parallel to these
two, however there is no grid street pattern due to the presence
of numerous one to two block long streets and large institutional
complexes. The pattern and total number of streets was
2
"Charles G. Hilgenhurst & Assoc., Design and Development
Options for the Longwood Medical Area, for the Medical Area
Service Corporation (November 1975).
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established one hundred years ago and never expanded after about
1915. Consequently, the much increased pedestrian and vehicular
densities that occurred over time have never been properly
accomodated.
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Chapter 3: DCPO's History and Continuing Role
The Massachusetts Division of Capital and Planning Operations
(DCPO) is the state's real property office. Established by the
Qmnibus Construction Reform Act of 1980, it is the bureaucracy
that oversees the design and construction of state buildings;
handles purchase, sale, lease and maintenance of land, buildings,
and facilities for the commonwealth; and assigns operating space
for all state agencies. There are currently 3000 buildings under
DCPO's jurisdiction.
DCPO was created after the completion of the Ward Commission
hearings. The Commission, which conducted 43 days of
investigations on a decade of corrupt state building practices,
issued a 2,000 page report on its findings. The results told of
payoffs and political favors, of contracts and design plans for
millions of dollars worth of buildings that were never
constructed, and of poorly constructed facilities that would cost
the state millions of dollars more to repair.
The establishment of DCPO meant the development of new and more
appropriate procedures and regulations to improve the quality of
design and construction of public facilities, and to award
contracts for projects in the commonwealth. Its mission, as
mandated by Chapter seven of the general laws of Massachusetts,
is stated as follows:
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to improve the quality of design and construction of
public facilities, and broaden and enhance equity in
awarding contracts for its projects... to provide the
people of the Commonwealth with buildings which are
designed and constructed according to the highest
professional and technical standards, at a fair cost,
in a reasonable controlled period of time, and which
serve the needs of their users.2"
Tunney Lee, the first Deputy Commisioner of DCPO envisioned the
agency as a "new, efficient, and accountable system to meet the
needs of state agencies." 2 6
DCPO as a relatively new bureaucracy, has demonstrated an
eagerness to establish a track record of accomplishment. Within
DCPO, the Office of Real Property which is the part of the agency
responible for disposition, has facilitated eight large
disposition projects over the past seven years of its existence.
It has done this through creating what it calls advisory
committees to draw up guidelines which will advise the deputy
commissioner of DCPO. Each of these projects has involved a
piece of property larger than two acres, and each has been
politically sensitive--involving divergent interest groups. Each
of the seven parcels has had its own timetable and only one has
completed all of the stages of the disposition process.
2 sAs described in The Massachusetts Division of Capital
Planning and Operations Annual Report, 1985, p. 12
2 6 Ibid., p. 24
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It is a process which involves a number of steps. The first step
involves polling local and state agencies in order to see if
there is some other public use for the property. If no such use
is determined, DCPO selects members for an advisory committee
that will create reuse dispostion guidelines. A public hearing
follows this. Next, the guidelines are sent to the state
legislature for approval and authorization. Finally, there is a
request for proposals from developers, DCPO chooses a developer,
negotiates a master plan with them, and oversees the final
development.
DCPO Starts the Process
The disposition process is codified in Chapter 7 of the
Massachusetts general law, sections 40E-40J ammended by 579 of
the Omnibus Construction Act of 1980, and superceded by Chapter
484 of the Acts of 1984.27. In Chapter 7, the deputy
commissioner of DCPO is charged to dispose of any property that
has been declared surplus to its own needs. If the property is
larger than 2 acres and it has been determined by a polling
process that no other state or local agencies desires it in "the
current or forseeable future. The parcel may be sold to "an
individual, entity, or the federal government." (Chapter 7, 40F
2 7 Both 579 and 484 were special acts that were incorporated
into Chapter 7.
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p.272) It is the deputy commissioner, advised by the governor
and the Secretary of Administration and Finance, who oversees the
process from beginning to end. She has overriding powers about
what will happen to the parcel, to whom it will be sold and how
it will be used, up until the time that the guidelines for reuse
restrictions are brought to the state legislature for review.
In March of 1987, the Deputy Commissioner of DCPO began the
disposition process for the MCA parcel when it filed legislation
as part of the Massachusetts Board of Regents legislation. This
was the first time that DCPO had ever tried to file legislation
before assembling an advisory committee. Officials at DCPO
explained that this was prompted by the fact that MCA is a state
college and therefore is subject to budgetary and space
considerations like other school-s mentioned in the Regents Bill.
DCPO included the MCA dispositon legislation in the Regents Bill
as an experiment to see if it would pass with the total bill, and
would therefore shorten the disposition process. The legislation
filed was extremely general and simply requested the
authorization for the deputy commissioner to proceed with the MCA
disposition process without any specific information or
suggestions about the reuse restriction guidelines. In so doing,
DCPO was attempting to make the lengthy disposition process more
efficient. However, it was also attempting to bypass a safeguard
-cumbersome as it may be--that was originally intended to insure
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a democratic process. Since the Regents Bill did not pass in the
spring, it was filed again in January of 1988, and its status is
pending.
Once the deputy commissioner declares a property surplus, she is
required by law to identify reuse restrictions for the parcel's
use which must "comply with established state and local plans and
policies." (Chapter 7, 40F p. 271) According to Chapter 7 states
requires that, "The deputy commissioner may convene an advisory
committee to advise him on reuses and to recommend reuse
restrictions for property declared surplus." (40E. p. 271) But
this is optional. If the deputy commissioner chooses, she may
write up personal recommendations for reuse restrictions, without
consulting another soul within DCPO or from the community. The
fact that this decision is made-alone by DCPO's senior officer,
demonstrates a bias toward strong executive control.
The MCA parcel, however, was identified by senior DCPO officials
as one of seven particularly sensitive projects. It was located
in an area where there had been a long history of tensions
between the institutions and the neighborhoods. Due to this, DCPO
proceeded by contacting the state senator and representative from
the Longwood Medical Area (LMA), to ask both of them to appoint
community representatives.
This process is required by law if the deputy commissioner
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convenes an advisory committee. The law states: "...the deputy
commissioner shall invite the representatives to the general
court from the city or town in which the property is located to
serve on the committee." (40F, p. 271) The law requires
representatives from the state legislature but does not
specifically require any citizen representatives. In this case,
the senator chose and representative appointed seasoned citizen
activists from their districts to represent them.
In addition to doing this, DCPO asked the Boston City Councilor
to make one appointment since he is charged with representing the
Fenway neighborhood and is familiar with the dynamics in the
community. The Mayor was also invited to appoint someone.
Although this is not required by Chapter 7, it is something that
PCPO has done in previous advisory meeting processes. In the MCA
case, the Mayor appointed two representatives, bringing the
number of community representatives up to five.
PCPO appointed five representatives from institutions in the
Longwood Medical Area that had no direct interest in developing
the MCA parcel. These members were from the following medical
and educational institutions: Harvard Medical School, Winsor
School for Girls (an abutter to the property), New England
Deaconess Hospital, Children's Hospital; and Brigham and Women's
Hospital. The chair chosen for the MCA advisory committee was a
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor of Architecture
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and Planning, who was selected for his technical expertise. Thus
the MCA-Longwood Citizen's Advisory Committee, as it was named by
DCPO, was composed of an equal number of representatives from the
community and institutional sectors, and a chair with technical
gpd academic background. This egalitarian representation of
interest groups surpassed the letter of the law.
The advisory committee is one of the two places in the state
disposition process where community members may participate and
have some influence. The only other place is a single public
hearing, which is mandatory for parcels exceeding two acres. The
Deputy Commissioner is required by law to conduct a single public
hearing on reuse restrictions before she sends her
recommendations to the house and senate committees on ways and
ineans, and the joint committee on state administration. According
to the law, the hearing must be held sixty days prior to
submission of a request to the general court for authority to
dispose of the property. The law also states that:
A notice of the public hearing shall also be placed,
at least once each week for the four consecutive
weeks preceding the hearing, in newspapers with
sufficient circulation to inform the people of the
the affected locality. The hearing shall be held in
the locality in which the property is located no sooner
than thirty days and no later than thirty-five days
after the notice is published in the central register.
(Chapter 7, 40F p. 272)
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The provision by law for such a hearing is laudible. However, a
further reading of the law shows that nothing much results from
this one time meeting. It is a formality before the Deputy
Commissioner can request authorization from the court to call for
requests for proposals from private developers. The law provides
go vehicle for public disapproval of the reuse restriction
guidelines. No vote is taken, no report filed following the
meeting.
The next usual step in the process, legislation is filed with the
state legislature. The deputy commissioner may or may not include
the reuse restriction guidelines arrived at by the advisory
committee--she may substitute any part of the committee
guidelines for her own, and may disregard all of the guidelines
if she so desires. In the MCA case, since legislation was filed
in the Board of Regents Bill, this step will be omitted if the
bill passes. In the final phase of the disposition process, if
the legislature approves the guidelines, the deputy commissioner
draws up a request for proposal announcement to developers that
incorporates any new restrictions or requirements that the
legislature has added. DCPO then evaluates proposals that are
consistent with reuse restrictions approved by the general court.
The deputy commissioner and DCPO executives then choose the
developer.
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Chapter 4: Roles of the Two Other Players
Institutional Concerns
The LMA contains 11 hospitals, 6 colleges and institutes, and 9
other educational and cultural institutions contained within a
180 acre tract. Together these institutions constitute a major
economic factor in the Commonwealth, employing over 20,000 staff
members with a total payroll expenditure of over $450 million
annually. The institutions of the LMA specialize in health care,
medical research and education, in 1986, more than 750,000
persons visited LMA hospitals and clinics, and nearly 100,000
others were admitted for care.
Between 1976 and 1984, medical and educational institutions of
the Longwood Medical Area (LMA), invested $597 million to develop
over 2.3 million square feet of new expansion space. The gross
square footage of building space occupied by institutions in the
LMA now exceeds 8 million square feet. According to DCPO's first
briefing document prepared for its MCA disposition advisory
committee, "Within the medical area itself development has shown
increasing density, with an upsurge in building verticality and
increasing development pressure on the remaining open space in
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the LMA." 2a
Three medical blocks form the hub of Boston's hospital
establishment. Harvard Medical School uses Brigham and Women's,
Massachusetts General, Beth Israel, Children's, Deaconess, the
West Roxbury Veteran's Adminstration Hospital, and Cambridge
ijospital as its teaching hospitals. Boston University Medical
School is affiliated with University Hospital, the Boston
Veteran's Adminisration Hospital, and Boston City Hospital.
Tufts Medical School draws on the New England Medical Center,
Faulkner, and St. Elizabeth for its teaching and research.
Together these hospitals have formed a powerful lobby group
called the Massachusetts Hospital Association, which influence
state policy.
Over the past few years, due to cost increases, the LMA medical
institutions have collaborated on complex diagnostic, theraputic,
and research procedures and projects. Examples of such
collaborations include: The LMA Joint Center for Radiation, The
Longwood Area Program in Neonatology, the Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Program, the Center for Research in Gastroenterology, and
the Center for Emerging Technologies.2'
2 8 Janet Billane and Susan Sklar, Massachusetts college of
Art: Longwood Building, Briefing Document One (August 1987) p.8.
2 9 Ibid., p. 9.
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But the service that the medical institutions of the LMA provide
to the citizens of Massachusetts, often falls short. Boston has
the highest in-patient hospital costs of any city in the nation.
In 1980, the average hospital stay in a Massachusetts hospital
cost $2734, compared to a national average of $1889. According
to a study by the city's Department of Health and Hospitals in
1979-80, the infant mortality rate in Boston was 14.3 (per 1000
live births) compared to the statewide rate of 10.8. For non-
Whites, however, the rate (20.5) was twice as high as that for
whites (10.2). In three low-income census tracts in Roxbury and
Mission Hill, the rate was above 50.3*
Statewide, the health care industry is a $7.5 billion a year
business--12% of the gross state product--above the national
average on a per capita basis. Each of these medical complexes
and their affiliated hospitals compete with one another for
prestige. Competition is for the latest equipment, for high
salaried medical researchers, for business school-trained
administrators. According to the authors of Who Rules Boston?,
the power structure of the hospitals is fairly transparant:
Although hospitals are nonprofit, tax-exempt, and
receive much of their funds from government programs,
their boards are dominated by the business power
structure, with almost no voice for employees,
patients, or community residents. Hospitals are big
business and they are run like big business... Trustees
3
*Boston Urban Study Group, Who Rules Boston? (Boston, MA:
The Institute for Democratic Socialism, 1984) p.78.
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hire administrators who think along the same lines. The
trustees' chief concern is the prestige and status of
their own hospitals... attracting researchers who gain
national stature by inventing surgical techniques that
make headlines, installing the latest high technology
equipment, and expanding facilities with the names of
3 1
prominenet donors.
In the late 1960's and 70's, hospitals and medical schools used
their influence with the BRA and the state Dept. of Health to get
expansion plans approved with little regard for the community's
interests. One instance of this occurred when Harvard Medical
School and three of its affiliated hospitals began buying real
estate in Mission Hill and making plans for major expansion.
Tenants started getting rent increases and then eviction notices.
A tenant group called Roxbury Tenants of Harvard joined with
Harvard students to oppose the plans. After years of grassroots
organizing, they forced Harvard to begin a program of housing
rehabilitation, to roll back rents, and to build new, tenant
controlled mixed-income housing.
Before the Ward Commission Report was issued, if the state wished
to dispose of a piece of property, it would pass a law putting
the parcel up for sale. According to Mitchell T. Rabkin,
President of Beth Israel Hospital, in the sixties and seventies,
BI submitted legislation annually which said that if the MCA
parcel should come up for sale, that it BI should be the
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3 'Who Rules Boston, p.78 (find bibliography card)
purchaser.
Rabkin described in an interview how there was periodic support
from the various institutions with letters from the Dean of the
jarvard Medical School, for example, supporting the notion that
BI should be the ones to develop the MCA site. Rabkin, "Each time
we reviewed this in the great and general court, there would be a
packet of letters that confirmed the fact that the
neighbors all thought that it was a good idea.""2
In the last six years, with the creation of DCPO and a new
disposition process, BI has lobbied various LMA hospitals to
support its quest for the property. BI administrators discussed
the issue of the MCA parcel informally with other hospital
administrators when they would see each other at meetings about
joint medical area activities. According to Rabkin:
We've gotten commitment from Harvard Medical School,
Children's Hospital, Brigham and Women's, New England
Deaconess, and Dana Farber that A) the site should be
devoted to medical purposed in the LMA, and B) BI is
the appropriate developer. And furthermore, we went
ahead before this process even began to develop our
document which was to be a stimulus for the thinking
of all parties that might have an interest [in it]...
A senior offical at DCPO, described DCPO position toward the
medical instititions of the LMA and in particular BI in an
3 2 Interview with Mitchell Rabkin, October 15, 1987.
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interview:
We're trying to do something solid. We're also
trying to advance public policy; in this case that
means doing those things that contribute to medical
technology. That's an important job sector, and it's
important to the Massachusetts economy...We're
committed to enhancing the overall life of the LMA.
It's a collective of hospitals. The reason
we talked to BI, is because BI...has been nominated
by all of the hospitals to act on their behalf. Our
commitment is not to BI, but to the LMA, as a collection
of very powerful, useful institutions.
Although, the DCPO official also states in the interview that
"there have been no pledges or guarantees made to BI," we can see
that DCPO is envisioned by its administrators as a collection of
powerful medical institutions rather than as a collection of
institutions and neighborhoods, and that this view is a
reflection of a market system.
Community Concerns
Community participation in the LMA mirrors a long tradition of
organized community participation in U.S. government. The
greatest impetus for citizen participation among low income and
minority neighborhoods came through the influence of the civil
rights movement and resulting federal mandates. Citizens
demanded to be part of the decisionmaking system in local, state,
and national government, particularly in those areas which
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directly affected their lives. Government officials such at
those at DCPO found that they had to learn to work with citizens,
and citizen advocates if they didn't want their projects to be
held up. In Boston, many voluntary associations and city-
sponsored community groups were created during the 1960-70 period
Ss a requirement by federal law. 3 3
In the 1980's, citizen participation is more of an established
form of leverage for social change. As a result of community
efforts there is increased awareness of the neighborhood goals
and the necessity to negotiate for the attainment of ones' own
objectives. According to Robert Salisbury, "Expanded citizen
participation has been on the agenda of many, perhaps most,
polities in recent years, partly for reasons of legitimation,
partly in an effort to secure mo-re efficient provision of
government services, but most importantly as an aspect of the
effort to redistribute power." 3*
The community representatives that have participated most
actively in the MCA land disposition process have been citizens
from the neighborhoods surrounding the LMA: Mission Hill to the
south and the Fenway to the northeast. Mission Hill is a working
3 3 Rubin Morton, Boston Urban Observatory, Organized Citizen
Participation in Boston (Boston: Boston University, Urban
Institute) 1971, introduction, p. vi.
"*Robert Salisbury, Citizen Participation in the Public
Schools (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books) 1980.
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class, residential area with two and three family homes
dominating the housing stock. The Fenway is also residential
with a housing stock dominated by apartments. Starting in the
1950s when the medical institutions of the LMA expanded into
these two residential communities, pushing out long-term
residents, conflict between hospitals and community groups became
an ongoing occurence. Over the years, community activists from
Mission Hill and the Fenway have become very experienced at
engaging in political battles with the LMA medical institutions.
One of the Mission Hill community respresentatives to the MCA
advisory committee, a lifelong resident of the neighborhood,
describes Mission Hill in the following way, "We are church
goers, working class, and law abiding. We are a racially
integrated neighborhood. The only people we won't tolerate are
drug dealers." The organizing core of her neighborhood, she
says, is made up of 80% women, many of them Irish Catholic.
She describes the atmosphere between the hospitals of the LMA and
the surrounding neighborhoods as tense:
Over the years the hospitals have tried to buy people
off with good will. They don't understand the concept
of being a good neighbor...The problem between the
institutions and the community is that there's a lack
of trust.
In defining community benefits, what is key is how you define the
term community. At a panel discussion of developer at the fourth
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DCPO advisory meeting, community was defined in two very
different ways. One speaker, a neighborhood activist, defined
community as the surrounding neighborhoods, while another speaker
representing Beth Israel Hospital, described community as "the
larger community or the Commonwealth." The hospital
representative justified his definition by explaining that the
hospitals serve all of the citizens of the commonwealth. The
hospital that he represented, he said, has never turned anyone
away from its doors.
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Chapter 5: Descriptions of Four Advisory Committee Meetings
The following are highlights of each of the four information
gathering advisory committee meetings.3
Meeting 1
The first Massachusetts College of Art (MCA) advisory meeting
took place on August 6, 1987. DCPO described the future schedule
for the committee and members introduced themselves. There was to
be a total of six meetings, ending in December of 1987. The
first four meetings would be devoted to information gathering,
the final two to determining reuse restriction guidelines for the
MCA parcel. Although it was a fairly uneventful meeting, certain
dynamics were established that would continue throughout the
meeting process.
After preliminaries by DCPO officials, a roundtable discussion
ensued among committee members. The first person to begin was the
representative from Children's Hospital, one of the five major
hospitals in the Longwood Medical Area (LMA). He immediately
framed the issue of future useage of the MCA property by
describing the MCA parcel as a "prime opportunity for Beth Israel
"sMeetings 1, 3, and 4 were attended by the author. Personal
notes and official DCPO minutes of the four meetings are referred
to throughout this chapter.
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Hospital, which has been landlocked for years." Although he
added that he thought the committee must consider how development
on the site adds to the overall area, he had succeeded in
identifying Children's affinity with Beth Israel (BI).
Tile representative from Children's Hospital concluded his remarks
py saying, "The institutions must look at the situation
collectively," emphasizing what was already common knowledge
among the assembled--that the Longwood Hospitals act as a bloc.
They all support an institutional planning organization named the
Medical Area Services Organization (MASCO), they are all part of
a lobbying effort called The Massachusetts Hospital Association,
and they meet together weekly or monthly to discuss common
ventures in the LMA. Over the past twenty five years, the major
hospitals of the LMA have written Beth Israel letters of support
toward their acquisition of the MCA parcel.
When it was the community representatives turn to speak, they
indicated a number of concerns about the MCA site. One
representative from Mission Hill stated her suspicions that the
community's needs would not be taken into account in this
advisory committee process. She predicted that the MCA parcel
would end up in the hands of the institution with the most clout.
She also expressed concern that the institutions in the LMA were
developing property without coordinating their needs. "There are
so many parking garages in the area," she said, "that soon there
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Won't be a Mission Hill, just one enormous parking garage for the
institutions."
All of the representatives mentioned problems produced by LMA
institutions such as the intrusion of hospital developments into
the neighborhoods, congested traffic, noise, pollution, and
parking overflow. All of the community representatives stressed
that some kind of public benefits must be included in the
guidelines. The representative from the Fenway mentioned that
since his neighborhood does not directly abut the parcel, traffic
effects and other problems are indirect, and benefits to the
community should likewise be offsite. The meeting chairman tried
to channel future thinking about the parcel by mentioning that
committee members would have to distinguish between area wide
challenges and site specific challenges.
Meeting 2
The second meeting, DCPO featured speakers from three different
sectors to discuss alternative program visions for the MCA
parcel. The speakers were from a private nonprofit institution--
Beth Israel Hospital, the Harvard School of Public Health, and a
staff member from the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Services.
The speaker from Beth Israel Hospital (BI), immediately
established BI's longstanding interest in the property as an
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area for possible expansion. In particular, he said, BI had a
critical need for modernized medical office and related parking
space. He also suggested that there might be collaborative
medical research uses for the site, such as shared research
laboratories and emerging medical technologies, which would
reduce costs.
His suggestions for community benefits were: a health education
or learning center serving LMA and area residents which might
include "a mini-museaum on health concerns, user-friendly
teaching exhibits, support service of space for lectures and
seminars." He also spoke of including commercial and retail uses
such as shops and restaurants, which he said, might provide
services and jobs to neighborhood residents. Other ideas for the
site were fitness, day care, or-elderly care facilities.
The representative from the Harvard School of Public Health
pointed out that while the MCA site is located within one of the
most sophisticated medical centers in the nation, the
neighborhoods that border it are characterized by high infant
mortality and illness rates. "The appropriate place to begin a
discussion of the site's potential," he said, " was with the
community," with health concerns in particular.
The staff member from the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Services
stressed the need for "careful and comprehensive planning." The
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community representatives, he said, should not be rushed through
the meeting process. Instead, he suggested that they form a
subcommittee "to inventory and prioritize community benefits for
this project." The offical stressed that a key challenge of the
MCA committee process was to change the neighborhood's view of
the LMA institutions from suspicion to trust.
In the discussion following the presentations, a community
representative raised a new issue when she expressed her
discomfort with wording in the DCPO briefing document that had
been circulated previous to the meeting. There was an emphasis
that she did not like, she said, of not "burdening" the project
with too many community benefits. In her opinion, community
benefits should come first, particularly since "the property was
of such extraordinary value... (and) could support many benefits,
both community and medical." She expressed the need for
meaningful community participation without "a preordained
development program by DCPO." These statements marked a point in
the meeting process where it became clear that the community was
going to consitute an active and confrontative presence on the
advisory committee.
The Fenway community representative added that the community
subcommittee agreed with the notion that the onsite development
on the MCA parcel should be set aside for predominantly medical
purposes. The community strategy here was that the community
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would be cooperative as long as they got substantial offsite
penefits. Community representatives, he stated, should prepare a
"laundry list" of targeted offsite benefits. The chairperson
endorsed this suggestion as well as the previous recommendation
for a community subcommittee to coordinate community concerns.
This idea was also endorsed by the representative from Children's
Hospital.
Meeting 3
At this meeting, there were several presentations on various
considerations of the MCA and LMA sites: design, historical
preservation, and a traffic overview. The speakers were arranged
for by DCPO in keeping with therr goal of providing the advisory
committee with the information necessary to arrive at reuse
restriction guidelines.
Following the traffic report which was given by a consultant for
the Medical Area Services Corporation (MASCO), the planning
organization for institutions of the LMA, there were strong
reactions from a community member. The representative felt that
the information that was presented reflected what the LMA
institutions wished to see. Since the neighborhoods were not
included in the traffic study conducted for MASCO, she felt that
the results weren't meaningful. To illustrate her point, she
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described how over the years, residents of Mission Hill had lost
85% of their parking spaces to hospital employees, which was not
taken into account by the hospitals.
The community subcommittee that had convened as a result of
recommendations made at the previous meeting, presented a very
general description of a community benefits package. This
prompted a discussion between DCPO officals and the community
representative. The chair commented that it would be useful to
have more specific recommendations from the community, to which
the community representative replied that the subcommittee was
having a problem determining "the bottom line" that is, the total
amount of money that the community would receive to divide up for
various projects.
The community representative asked if DCPO knew the appraised
value of the MCA property. A DCPO offical responded that DCPO
was only responsible for determining the highest and best use for
the property. This is not true. According to Chapter 7, a call
for an financial appraisal of the surplus property is a step in
the disposition, which may occur at the beginning or the end of
the process. Although the timing is left ambiguous, DCPO
officials decided to bypass this step perhaps in order to spare
expense or even to withold facts on the property's value.
It became clear at this meeting that the community was not going
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to be content to get a handful of benefits and then find out
later that it had gotten shortchanged. Although the community
representatives were not necessarily in agreement about the
amounts and types of benefits they wanted for their
neighborhoods, there was general agreement among them that the
benefits to the neighborhoods should be offsite. Later there was
agreement that there should be some small percentage of space
devoted to general community benefits on the site as well. There
was also a strategy that the groups would act in a unified way
and would not be divided by DCPO or members from the private
sector. At this same meeting, DCPO expressed the wish to meet
with the community representatives in between large CAC meetings
in order to set up the the next meeting agenda.
Meeting 4
Tn this final information gathering meeting of the MCA
disposition process, there was an initial presentation by a DCPO
financial consultant on financial projections for the MCA parcel.
A panel discussion by four developers from different sectors
followed.
The financial consultant described his task as determining for
the state whether or not there were adequate cash flows emerging
from the MCA site using different financial scenarios. He also
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examined the individual items that had an impact on cash flow.
The consultant used many of the premises established by Beth
Israel Hospital in the Skidmore, Owings and Merrill report. These
were projections based on space allocations for offices,
commercial space, subsidized public space, residential units
(only in certain cases), and parking.
He presented financial outcomes for two different floor/area
ratios (FAR), 3 and 5, and whether the building remained or was
demolished for each of these. For all of these four alternatives
presented, the consultant projected positive annual cash flows
ranging from about $1.4 million (FAR 3) to 3.1 million (FAR 5).
He estimated the construction costs in his four scenarios as
ranging from $30 to $65 million.
After his presentation the panel presentation began. The first
developer to speak was a director of a nonprofit neighborhood
development corporation. From his point of view,. the parcel is a
a resource and belongs to he community. Although he didn't
define the term "community," his implication was the
neighborhoods. His approach to the property was to think about
how to structure a development around a piece of property which
would bring maximum benefits to the community. He said that he
wished to see the community as a partner in the MCA parcel in
perpetuity, without benefits evaporating or shrinking. Perhaps,
he suggested, the community should continue to own the land
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through a land trust.
The next two panelists were private developers. The first saw
the opportunity for the MCA site to be of service. His vision
was for medical and educational uses for the parcel, with the
state playing a "role of responsibility" by creating a
public/institutional partnership. The second developer described
the property as a "jewel"--the last space left in the LMA. He
envisioned the disposition process as an opportunity to review
past LMA development, to apply lessons learned from that parcel,
and to bring the community back into the medical area.
The final speaker, a representative from BI agreed that the MCA
site represented a special opportunity for development and that
the community was a critical component. The MCA property, he
said, "has an enormous impact on Beth Israel," since it is in
their front yard. He went on to define community as the larger
community or the commonwealth which includes BI, since, he said,
it serves the public. Then, if we use this broader definition,
he said, the community is entitled to ask that a medical and
educational center be built on the MCA parcel. The speaker
concluded by saying that he didn't think a mixed use
Medical/education center would produce enough funds to support
significant neighborhood benefits. Any cash flows that were
generated, he said, would be used to pay property taxes to the
city.
60
Chapter 6: Analysis and Conclusion
The process that The Massachusetts Division of Capital Planning
god Operations (DCPO) set up for disposing of the Massachusetts
Qollege of Art (MCA) surplus land is fairly democratic. The MCA
disposition process, in particular, demonstrates how elegant the
process can be if it is used well. The MCA advisory committee in
its determinations about reuse restriction guidelines was often
pluralistic, efficient, and interactive in its functioning.
However, it is this author's prediction that one powerful medical
institution in the Longwood Medical Area (LMA)--Beth Israel
Hospital (BI)--will ultimately suceed in winning the development
rights for the property. Since-BI made it clear for twenty-five
years that it was interested in the MCA property for its own
expansion, we are forced to examine the DCPO disposition process
in order to understand the mediating role of the state and how
there is an institutional bias toward private interests versus
community interests.
In all of our reflections, it is important to remember that the
DCPO large disposition process is still fairly new. Legislation
which was created in reaction to corrupt practices in the
commonwealth, has wrinkles that are now beginning to reveal
themselves as DCPO continues to evolve as a bureaucracy. The
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legislation regulation the disposition of public property was
created at the same time as the entire office of DCPO.
The laws for disposition are far too vague and undirected.
Policy decisions are for the most part left to the discretion of
the deputy commissioner and the DCPO officials that she hires to
facilitate the process. The loopholes in the process are too
large to allow for a consistent bureaucratic stand. At the
present time DCPO does not have a clear directive toward
capitalism, democratic pluralism, or both. The process needs to
be formalized. The author argues that DCPO as a bureaucracy
mirrors the capitalist system in its goals. DCPO as a state
agency will tend to support the medical institutions of the
Longwood Medical Area because they bring revenue in to the state
and constitute a powerful lobby-
Since World War II and the creation of the welfare state, the
state has also been charged with protecting the less powerful or
disenfranchised groups in the U.S. Although it could be argued
that DCPO brought citizens onto its disposition advisory
committee as token representatives, the irony of the situation is
that, the mere act of including them, created a window which
allowed for their influence and therefore an interactive process.
The raising of issues by diverse groups affects a more democratic
process. Committee members are forced to listen to differing
opinions and to negotiate if they want anything to get done.
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Trust is lacking in the DCPO advisory committee process. As the
community representative from Mission Hill put it at the
beginning of the advisory meeting process:
First it is not a committee formed by the neighborhood.
Second, DCPO plans the agenda. It isn't a process that
we can trust. There are a lot of issues that still need
to be addressed. When DCPO and the hospitals talk about
public benefits, that means that they are planning to sell
the [MCA] property for less than it's worth. They will
see what the hospitals want in order to determine what the
the benefits will be for the neighborhoods.
There is clear evidence that DCPO's disposition process was
conceptualized from the start as a vehicle for BI.
DCPO as a relatively new bureaucracy, has demonstrated an
eagerness to establish a track record of accomplishment. As a
state agency, DCPO's role is facilitator and decision maker.
This might have been the prime motivating factor when high level
state officials decided to move forward on the MCA disposition
process. Since the old MCA building on the corner of Brookline
and Longwood Avenues still housed the 3-D laboratories:
sculpture, ceramics, glass, and metals, it was not ready to be
disposed by the state. These departments require expensive
equipment and an approximate total area of 30,000 sq. ft. New
space for them will demand extensive renovation of older
buildings on the new MCA campus, and will involve special kilns,
cooling pits, plumbing, venting, electrical fixtures, etc.
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If temporary replacement space could be found for these
departments by the future developer of the property during the
interim period of time, the state wouldn't have to wait to begin
disposition process. This decision demonstrates an impatience on
the part of administrators to initiate process--in this case,
perhaps prematurely. The cost of relocating all of these
laboratories for several years and then once more after that, is
exorbitant.
Further evidence that DCPO wished to accelerate the disposition
processis the fact that it set a six month advisory committee
schedule to determine reuse restriction guidelines. DCPO Office
of Real Property staff scheduled one meeting a month for four
Months to gather background information. And two additional
meetings after that to establish the guidelines themselves. The
process was projected to be completed by January 1988, with a
public meeting in February, and a request for proposals in spring
of 1988.
Were there any other factors that motivated DCPO to push ahead?
This author speculates that DCPO started the process knowing that
it had a ready and willing potential developer in Beth Israel
Hospital (BI), since BI had made public its interest in the
property for over twenty five years. The 2.3 acre MCA parcel sits
directly to the southwest of BI. It is the only available site
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for BI's expansion in the immediate area.
The initial medical and educational uses fixed by DCPO before the
advisory meeting process, indicate a bias twoard the medical
institutions of the LMA, specifically BI. Before DCPO even
assembled its Citizen's Advisory Committee, senior officials at
the agency decided that the primary uses for the property should
ke set. Although these uses make some sense given the nature of
the LMA, it is odd that officials felt compelled to decide the
uses in advance of what was billed as a democratic process.
When questioned about why the agency chose medical and education
uses for the MCA parcel, a senior offical at DCPO at first
responded that it was done for good "planning" reasons. However,
as he continued, it became clear that there were other reasons
behind DCPO's decision:
It's a judgement made by the Deputy Commissioner,
consistent with his power... based on the location of
the site, the value of the LMA, the contribution being
made to the LMA, and how valuable the LMA is to the city
and to society... Planning practice suggests consistency
within zones.. .Marketability is also important...the
liklihood that something is going to succeed... Our
commitment is not to BI, but to the LMA, as a collection
of very powerful, useful institutions. Those collective
institutions have spoken through BI, as we understand it,
and they've said that they'd like to see that land
disposed of for educational and medical uses.
Although this same senior official decribed DCPO executives as
decision makers "not power brokers," it is evident from his
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statement that administrators are indeed making decisions, and
that economic success has been an important consideration for
determining uses. It is also clear that these officials are not
rendering "objective" directives for the LMA. The senior official
states in the same interview that "there have been no pledges or
guarantees made to BI," we can see that DCPO is envisioned by its
administrators as a collection of powerful medical institutions
rather than as a collection of institutions and neighborhoods,
and that this view reflects the market system. In the MCA case--
given the historical tension between the institutions and the
community, the decision about uses should have been made between
those two parties, not by a facilitating bureaucracy that was
supposed to running a politically neutral process.
In the disposition process for the MCA parcel, the deputy
commissioner of DCPO convened an advisory committee to make
recommendations about the reuse restrictions for the property,
but there is some ambiguity about the committee structure itself.
Tunney Lee, the first Deputy Commissioner of DCPO, an MIT
Professor of Urban Studies and community planner, established a
tradition of convening what he called Citizen's Advisory
Committees (CAC's) to establish disposition guidelines. The
name, borrowed from the community movement in the sixties and
seventies, described committees made up of neighborhood delegates
representing citizen interests in city or state government
through direct participation.
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The MCA advisory committee does in fact include community
representatives, therefore providing an outlet for neighborhood
concerns. Also, the reuse restriction guidelines coming from the
committee have some protection by the state legislature. But
PCPO's "CAC's" as they stand, leave too many details to the
discretion of the deputy commissioner. Although in the case of
the MCA, the advisory committee is composed of an equal number of
community and institutional representatives, this equal
representation is not guaranteed in future disposition processes.
In terms of the actual committee structure called for in Chapter
7, if an advisory committee is convened at all, some undesignated
number of representatives from the community should be invited.
The law does not call for a balance of participants from the
different sectors. In addition, the Deputy Commissioner has veto
power over the guidelines. She can propose her own reuse
restriction guidelines, bypassing the community component
of the process.
DCPO assumed from the start that the community would reap a
relatively minor share of the benefits of the development. The
community representatives have been challenging DCPO's insistence
that they name their benefit requirements early in the process,
but they have not been challenging DCPO's central assumption that
they cannot be contenders to develop the MCA parcel, that the
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parcel will go to the highest bidder who will agree to the
committee's terms. The community does not have the financial
clout to seriously challenge DCPO's plans.
Although the MCA disposition process is not yet over and policy
cannot be set from any one disposition case, there are some
obvious recommendations for fine tuning the DCPO advisory
committee processes: uses for disposition properties should be
by determined by the appointed advisory committee in a democratic
process and representatives from the various interest groups
should be chosen thoughtfully with an eye toward balancing
opposing parties. If officials are vigilant, a process like the
DCPO land disposition advisory committee can serve as a model for
other disposition projects as well as a range of democratic
procedures in a politically paradoxical society.
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